Abstract. To pay for environmental and public infrastructure costs associated with shale gas wells, Pennsylvania introduced a per-well Impact Fee despite concerns that it would discourage industry investment. Using a quasi-experimental design and data that nearly cover the universe of leases and wells in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia, we find that leasing by energy firms declined dramatically after the Fee's enactment, but little to no declines in well permitting or drilling occurred in the most geologically similar subsample.
Introduction
Drilling in shale formations rich in oil and gas has caused the U.S. to become the global leader in hydrocarbon production. The growth has come at a cost: the unconventional methods used to extract oil and gas from shale can have more environmental and public infrastructure costs than conventional methods (Jenner and Lamadrid 2013) . The typical shale well requires hundreds of trips by large trucks bringing millions of gallons of water and tons of sand to the well site, with further trips required to remove waste water (Kargbo, Wilhelm, and Campbell 2010; Abramzon et. al. 2014) . Despite the local externalities of shale wells, major producing states have been slow to apply additional taxes to cause firms to internalize these costs. Texas has even exempted high cost wells, which tend to be shale wells, from its natural gas severance tax.
The reticence to tax the industry stems from the expectation that higher state taxes will cause energy firms to invest less. Less investment is not a problem from an efficiency standpoint-it simply indicates that some wells become uneconomical if firms must pay the well's full cost, assuming that the tax represents the well's social cost. Voters, however, care about local income opportunities such as royalties from leasing land or wages from drillingrelated employment. Policy makers seeking to address externalities will therefore prefer that the tax generates revenues to pay for damaged roads but has little effect on industry investment, labor demand, or payments to resource owners.
An extensive literature explores the growth-environment tradeoff and quantifies the effect of environmental regulations or taxes on firm decisions, with the expectation that policies causing firms to internalize additional costs will reduce investment in high-tax jurisdictions and possibly increase it elsewhere (e.g. List et al. 2003; Ederington, Levinson, and Minier 2005; Martin, de Preux, and Wagner 2014) . One literature review found that studies using panel data consistently find negative effects of environmental regulation on firm decisions (Brunnermeier and Levinson 2004) . The review's general empirical finding, however, may not apply to industries whose existence depends on geographically-fixed attributes like endowments of oil or natural gas, which may reduce a firm's willingness to relocate. Less firm mobility, in turn, would limit the ability of jurisdictions to compete with each other for investment by weakening environmental policies (Fredriksson and Millimet 2002) . Perhaps more importantly, energy firms typically do not own the acreage that they drill. Instead, they lease it from others. If the supply of acreage for drilling is fairly inelastic, firms will pass a large share of additional costs to resource owners, reducing the scarcity rent associated with owning a depletable natural resource. In turn, the tax or regulation will have little or no effect on industry investment.
We study how Pennsylvania's introduction of a per-well Impact Fee affected leasing, permitting, drilling, lease terms, and well productivity. The state has been the center of the renaissance of the U.S. natural gas industry. At the onset of large-scale development in 2009, Pennsylvania ranked 13th in natural gas production among U.S. states; by 2013, it ranked second, behind only Texas. Recognizing the public costs of the burgeoning industry, in February of 2012 the state introduced an Impact Fee on each shale well, with the present value of the Fee payments representing about five percent of the cost of drilling a well. The Fee applied to wells drilled in prior years, and within 15 months of the Fee's enactment, well operators paid the state $406 million.
To study the effect of the Impact Fee, we use a difference-in-differences quasi-experimental design with the Marcellus Shale portions of Ohio and West Virginia as comparisons. All three states experienced similar trends in shale development prior to the introduction of the Fee.
Proprietary data that nearly cover the universe of leases and wells in both states permit estimating effects at the state, well, and lease level. We find that the Fee reduced the acreage being leased and led to less generous terms in leases with resource owners. Effects on well permitting and drilling are less clear, with little to no declines observed in the most geologically similar subsample. We estimate that at least 60 percent of the decline in leasing is explained by the initial Impact Fee payment, which reduced firm liquidity in a time of low natural gas prices and shrinking credit lines. Consistent with the liquidity-crunch explanation, there is no evidence that the Fee caused firms operating in Pennsylvania to shift leasing to Ohio or West Virginia. The limited ability of firms to pass the Fee onto resource owners also helps explain the decline in leasing. The terms of leases signed before the Fee could not be changed, and for leases signed afterward, we estimate that resource owners will pay half of the Fee over the life of the well, mostly through lower royalty rates.
Literature

Shale Development and Its Effects. Various books and articles describe the origins
of what The Economist magazine termed "The Shale Revolution" (Montgomery and Smith 2010; Wang and Krupnick 2013; Zuckerman 2013) . Geologists and petroleum engineers have long known that numerous shale formations contained large quantities of oil and gas, but cost-effective methods of extraction eluded the industry until Mitchel Energy began to successfully use horizontal wells and hydraulics to release economical quantities of natural gas from Texas' Barnett Shale around 2000. The innovation soon spread to other formations such as the Marcellus in the Northeast and the Bakken in North Dakota (Zuckerman 2013 ).
States such as Ohio and Pennsylvania have had intense public debates over taxation of the shale industry. Political support for limited taxation stems in part from perceptions of the industry's contribution to local and state economies. Although most input-output studies overstate the income and employment effects of the industry, a large empirical literature documents the net gains in jobs and wages created by oil and gas development (Weber 2012; Allcott and Keniston 2014; Brown 2014; Weber 2014; Paredes, Komarek, and Loveridge 2015; Munasib and Rickman 2015) . Nationally, Feyrer, Mansur, and Sacerdote (2017) estimate that new oil and gas extraction over the 2005-2012 period generated as much as 640,000 jobs nationally.
1 In addition to the labor market effects, shale development has generated tens of billions of dollars in royalty payments for resource owners, increasing rural land values and stimulating local economies (Fitzgerald 2014; Weber and Hitaj 2015; Brown, Fitzgerald, and Weber 2016b, a) . There is also evidence that development generally led to increases in average housing values (Jacobsen 2015; Boslett, Guilfoos, and Lang 2016; Weber, Burnett, and Xiarchos 2016) .
Shale development has further generated billions in revenues for state governments, either through leasing of state lands or through taxes on production (Newell and Raimi 2015; Weber, Wang, and Chomas 2016) . In states that tax oil and gas wells as property, new wells have also expanded the property tax base and increased revenues to local schools and governments (Marchand and Weber 2015; Weber, Burnett, and Xiarchos 2016 Marchand and Weber (2017) roughly a million dollars per student to their tax base through increases in the assessed value of oil and gas wells.
Shale development, however, involves extensive use of public resources and negative environmental or quality-of-life externalities. Roads are the most affected public good. Bringing equipment and fracking materials such as water and sand to the well site requires hundreds of trips for tractor trailers and semi-trucks. One study found that each shale gas well in Pennsylvania caused between $5,400 and $10,000 in damages to state roads (Abramzon et al. 2014 ). Unsurprisingly, Weber and Harleman (2015) found that per capita road expenditures for Pennsylvania municipalities with substantial drilling increased by 30 percent relative to pre-drilling levels. Other public costs include increased demand for police and emergency services and government staff time (Anderson and Theodori 2009; Kelsey 2014; Newell and Raimi 2015) .
A growing literature documents the environmental and quality of life consequences of shale development. Improper treatment and discharge of wastewater has been linked to declines in surface water quality (Olmstead et al. 2013; Warner et al. 2013) . Concerns over groundwater contamination led to a negative relationship between the location of wells and the value of groundwater-dependent homes in Pennsylvania (Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber 2014; Muehlenbachs, Spiller, and Timmins 2015) . People living near a natural gas well can also experience more air pollution, particularly when the well is hydraulically fractured (McKenzie et al. 2012) . Litovitz et al. (2013) estimate that shale gas extraction in Pennsylvania created $7 to $32 million in environmental and health damages in 2011. Also looking at Pennsylvania, Hill (2013) found evidence that drilling increased the incidence of low-birth weight babies. Because of increased truck traffic, local residents also face busier and more dangerous roads, which increases travel times, stress, and the likelihood of an accident (Graham et al. 2015 ).
Taxing or Regulating Externalities.
A large literature explores the effects of environmental regulations on investment (Keller and Levinson 2002; Hanna 2010) , firm creation (List et al. 2003) , firm location decisions (Levinson 1996; Brunnermeier and Levinson 2004) , productivity (Becker 2011; Greenstone, List, and Syverson 2012) , and overall welfare . Most findings suggest that regulation reduces firm creation, total factor productivity, and investment, and encourages firms to locate elsewhere.
(e.g. Parry 1995; Metcalf 2009 ), the empirical literature linking environmental taxes to firm behavior is smaller. Martin et al. (2014) study the effect of a carbon tax on manufacturing plants in the United Kingdom and find that it reduced the energy intensity of production but did not affect firm size or survival. Similarly, Curtis (2014) finds that the U.S. cap-and-trade program on nitrogen oxides emissions reduced manufacturing employment by 1.7 percent.
A related literature considers how taxes on oil and gas production in particular affect exploration and production. This literature suggests that production is insensitive to marginal changes in tax rates (Yï¿oecel 1989; Deacon 1993; Kunce 2003; Kunce et al. 2003; Chakravorty, Gerking, and Leach 2010) . All of the studies cited, however, base their conclusions on simulations. Although parameterized with industry data, simulations are distinct from observing behavioral responses to an exogenous change in taxation. The only empirical study, Rao (2010) , finds that energy firms respond on the intensive margin, with a 1 percent increase in the after-tax price of oil in California reducing oil production by about 0.25 percent.
Conceptual Framework
There are good reasons to expect a tax on wells to affect leasing, drilling, compensation to resource owners, and well productivity. Consider a region with parcels that differ only in their endowment of natural gas, with all parcels j having the same endowment q j . Energy firms access the natural gas through a lease with the parcel owner. Compensation in the standard oil and gas lease occurs through a combination of an up-front fixed payment, often referred to as a bonus payment, and a share of the value of production, with the share known as the royalty rate. The fixed payment guarantees a minimum compensation to the parcel owner while the royalty allows the firm and owner to share price and production risk. When the owner has imperfect information about resource quantities, the royalty also helps her capture more rents by conditioning compensation on production, which is verifiable (Hendricks, Porter, and Tan 1993) .
Parcel owners vary in their willingness to lease out their parcels, which causes variation in the reservation compensation. With greater compensation offered, more owners are willing to lease, leading to an upward sloping parcel supply curve for all parcels with the same endowment. On the demand side, conditional on an endowment q j , energy firms demand more parcels when the compensation required to lease them is lower. For all parcels of endowment q j , the market clears at the royalty rate and fixed payment that drives economic profits to zero. Assuming (for simplicity) that parcel owners have the same preferences for compensation through royalties versus fixed payments, all owners of parcels with endowment j and that sign a lease, do so for the same royalty rate and fixed payment: r (q j ), f p (q j ).
A per well tax increases the cost of developing each parcel, causing firms to demand fewer parcels at each compensation and endowment level. In turn, the compensation and the number of parcels leased will generally decrease. Because leasing is a necessary precursor to drilling, less leasing eventually leads to less drilling.
The exact decline in compensation and leasing (and by extension, drilling) depends on the elasticity of the acreage supply and demand curves. The more inelastic the supply curve, the larger the decline in compensation and the smaller the decline in the number of parcels leased. With a perfectly inelastic supply curve, the tax is fully passed-through to parcel owners, and there is no change in leased acreage. At the other extreme-a perfectly elastic supply curve-there is no change in compensation but a large decline in leased acreage. The tax is then borne by unleased parcel owners and by energy firms who now develop less acreage.
By causing marginal parcels to go unleased and undrilled, introduction of a per-well tax should increase average well productivity. The royalty rate and fixed payment have a lowerbound of zero (in practice, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia have a legal minimum royalty rate of 12.5 percent). Less demand for parcels to lease will drive compensation to below the reservation level for all parcel owners over some range of parcel endowments. The foregone leasing of low-endowment parcels causes the average endowment of leased parcels to be greater with the tax than without it, increasing average well productivity.
The productivity of the average well may increase for another reason: a per-well tax creates an incentive for firms to increase the area covered by each well. The advent of horizontal drilling makes such a response possible. Drilling a longer horizontal well allows the energy firm to cover more area with fewer wells, which reduces the firm's tax burden and increases well productivity. If, however, profit-seeking investors eventually cause all profitable acreage to be developed, retroactive application of the Fee merely delays leasing and development. Moreover, if the supply side of energy markets tends to over-invest in times of high prices, thus sowing the seeds of an eventual price collapse, the delay in leasing and development could improve efficiency by shifting some development to a higher-price period.
3.2. Pass Through Via Royalty Rates Or Fixed Payments. Would firms pass-through the tax primarily through lower royalty rates or lower fixed payments? If firms face liquidity constraints, they would reduce the fixed payment more than the royalty rate because the payment occurs upon signing the lease whereas royalty payments only start when production begins, which may occur several years after signing the lease, if ever. If the salience of lease terms matters, firms would reduce the term least salient to parcel owners. Fixed payments are arguably more salient than royalties since a parcel owner can readily calculate his total payments as the per acre rate times the total acres leased. Royalties involve more tedious calculations and assumptions about prices, well production curves, and more. Lastly, the risk preferences of the firm and parcel owner would also affect which terms are most adjusted.
Assuming that parcel owners are more averse to risk at the margin, the firm would reduce the royalty rate instead of the fixed payment, allowing it to pass-through more of the tax than if it also (or solely) reduced the fixed payment. Fee decreases as the well ages and depends on the annual price of natural gas in a stepwise fashion. For a well drilled in the present year, the firm operating the well owes the state $50,000, assuming a natural gas price between $3.00 and $4.99 per thousand cubic feet (mcf). In the following year it would owe $40,000, in the year after, $30,000, and so on. The
Fee schedule in the initial Corbett proposal roughly matches the actual Fee schedule in the lowest price scenario ($2.25/mcf or lower). 
Data
We consider six outcomes. The extensive margin analysis considers acres leased, well permits issued, and wells drilled. On the intensive margin, we look at lease royalty rates, lease bonus payments, and well productivity. The study area includes the Marcellus Shale area of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia as shown in Figure (1) . The study period is November 21, 2010 to December 10, 2012, which covers 450 days prior to the enactment of the Impact Fee and 300 days afterwards.
5.1. Lease Data. Proprietary data from Drillinginfo nearly cover the universe of leases signed in the study region and period. 5 We construct two sub-samples, one for the number of acres leased and one for royalty rates. A single grantor may own and lease multiple parcels under a single lease, in which case Drillinginfo reports duplicate lease entries for each parcel.
We drop duplicate leases and those missing latitude and longitude coordinates, which gives our primary sample of 102,969 of leases.
For acres leased, we further edit the primary sample to avoid double-counting acreage.
Where multiple parties share ownership of a parcel, the energy firm must sign a lease with each owner. We group leases by state, county name, grantee name (the entity leasing the parcel), parcel area, and parcel number, and drop leases within each group that occurred within one year of the original lease's record date. Each lease record in the resultant dataset of 67,365 observations corresponds to a unique parcel or agglomeration of parcels.
For royalty rates, we use all leases between distinct parties even if multiple leases refer to the same parcel because each party can negotiate distinct terms. Starting with our primary sample of leases, we drop leases where the names of the grantor (the entity owning the rights being leased) and the grantee are the same or where the grantee ever appears as a grantor.
We also drop leases with royalty rates below the legal minimum of 12.5 percent or above 50
percent. The resultant data set has 24,769 distinct leases.
5.2. Well Data. Drillinginfo provides two data sources for horizontal wells. The first source provides the location of the universe of horizontal wells in the three states, and the date each well was drilled. Restricting attention to wells drilled in our study period gives 6,845 wells and is the basis of our analysis of drilling. The second data source includes all wells that have been brought into production. It provides each well's date of first production and the average daily production (in thousands of metric cubic feet, mcf) in the first full month of production, which we use as our measure of productivity. This leaves 2,601 wells with productivity data and is the basis of our productivity analysis. The difference in the number of wells in the drilling and productivity datasets in part reflects wells that have not been brought into production. To be included in the drilling dataset, the well only needs a spud date, which means that a vertical hole has been started. The date of first production may be months or years later.
5.3. Permit Data. Drillinginfo provides data on permitted wells. Wells enter the permit data when the permit has been issued and a unique American Petroleum Institute number has been assigned to the well. We focus on permits issued within our study window and region, which leaves a total of 10,364 permitted wells. The number of wells permitted is larger than the number of wells drilled because of the time lag between permitting and drilling and because some permitted wells may never be drilled. This is unsurprising. Pennsylvania and West Virginia in particular share similar geology.
Two key shale attributes are depth and thickness, with thicker shale holding more natural gas. Likewise, gas in deeper shale tends to be under higher pressure, which increases well productivity. Empirical evidence suggest that both depth and thickness are correlated with greater ultimate recovery (Brown et al. 2016b ). In both states, the majority of the Marcellus has a thickness of 50 to 150 feet and a depth of 4,000 to 6,000 feet.
The Marcellus is thinner and more shallow in Eastern Ohio, however, the geology of Eastern Ohio is similar to parts of northern West Virginia and southwestern Pennsylvania when considering the Utica Shale. The Utica lies below the Marcellus, and saw growth in development over the study period. We also note that the Marcellus and Utica formations in parts of eastern Ohio, northern West Virginia, and western Pennsylvania are rich in natural gas liquids such as ethane, propane, and butane.
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Regarding policy differences across the states, Ohio has had a long-standing tax on the quantity of oil and gas produced, which in recent years has average 0.3 percent of the value of production (Weber, Wang, and Chomas 2016) . Tax rates and drilling permit fees did not change during the study period. Since 1993, West Virginia has had a 5 percent severance tax on the value of natural gas extracted. Pennsylvania and control states exhibited parallel trends prior to the introduction of the Fee;
2) the Fee did not affect outcomes in control states; and 3) there was no shocks to outcomes of interest during the study period that affected Pennsylvania and control states differently.
We assess the first two assumptions in the following sections. Well-level data in Figure (9) show that well productivity was improving in both groups before the announcement. The growth was initially stronger in control states but then it flattened in the months before the Fee announcement, matching the trend in Pennsylvania.
The flat trend in productivity in both areas in the five months before announcement helps to validate our empirical approach. One threat to identification is that drilling technology and knowledge of geology evolved differently and caused leasing, for example, to increase in control states relative to Pennsylvania. In so much as well productivity reflects improvements in technology and knowledge, the trends suggests that such evolution was similar for
Pennsylvania and control states.
Spillover Effects in Ohio and West Virginia?
It is possible that the Impact Fee caused some firms to shift investment to control states, which would make them less informative as a counter-factual scenario. To investigate potential spillovers in leasing, we identify firms that, prior to the announcement date, operated exclusively in Pennsylvania, exclusively in control states, or in both areas. Firms already operating in both areas are the most likely to have shifted leasing to control states because they would have been directly affected by the Fee because of their activity in Pennsylvania but would have already incurred the fixed cost of beginning operations in control states because of past activity there.
Panel A of Table ( 2) reports the total acreage leased in Pennsylvania by two groups:
grantees that initially only leased land in Pennsylvania and grantees that leased in both Pennsylvania and control states. Over the announcement and enactment of the Fee, the two groups had similar reductions in leasing in Pennsylvania. Panel B reports total acreage leased in control states, also by two groups: grantees that initially only leased land in control states and grantees leasing land in Pennsylvania and control states. Grantees leasing in both areas had the largest reduction in leasing in control states in the five months following enactment.
They also had the smallest increase in the five to ten months after enactment. greatly reduces the number of periods for when zeros are observed when looking at various subsamples, (e.g. only border counties), thereby facilitating using the natural log of the outcome as the dependent variable.
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We divide the 750 day study time frame into five 150 day periods. The first two periods occur before the announcement of the Impact Fee proposal (month -5); the third period starts with the Fee's announcement and ends with its enactment (month 0); the last two periods are after enactment. This division of the study time frame permits testing for a difference in prior trends, estimating the effect of the Fee proposal's announcement, and allowing the effect of enactment to change over time. We do this using the following model:
P A s is a dummy variable for Pennsylvania, with the excluded category being the control state group. The parameter θ captures the average value of y in the control states in the reference period while β shows the average difference in y between Pennsylvania and the control states in the same period. We include the log of the New York Mercantile Exchange futures market price of natural gas as well as the interaction between the price and the Pennsylvania dummy variable. The interaction term helps control for the possibility that changing natural gas prices had different effects in Pennsylvania and control states.
Regarding The intensive margin analysis uses lease-level data for royalty rates, county-level data for bonus payments, and well-level data for well productivity. For each outcome, we estimate models similar to those in the extensive margin analysis, with the only difference being the unit of observation and the control variables included. The intensive margin models control for county fixed effects, which account for the possibility that leasing and drilling shifted to counties with worse (or better) geology over time. The royalty rate and well productivity regressions also control for firm fixed effects, which account for changes in firm composition.
For royalty rates we also control for the log of the parcel size; for well productivity we control for the log of the well's depth. In all intensive-margin models we also allow the effect of natural gas prices to be state-specific. Estimates in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Table ( 3) indicate that prior to the announcement of the Fee, Pennsylvania and control states had statistically indistinguishable trends in leasing for three of the four samples. Looking at columns 2, 4, 6, and 8, the coefficient on P A × P ost-Enactment [0 months, 5 months] , which corresponds to the five months following enactment, is negative and large across all samples, though the standard errors are also large. In the five to ten months after enactment, leasing declined further in Pennsylvania compared to control states, with the estimated coefficient being large and statistically significant across all samples. Across the four samples, the policy effect five to ten months after enactment ranges from a decline of 0.79 log points (near-border counties) to a decline of 1.46 log points (liquids-rich counties), with a full sample effect of -1.24 log points. The full-sample effect represents a 71 percent decline in leasing relative to the level of leasing observed in the five months before announcement (= e −1.24 − 1).
As with leasing, Pennsylvania and control counties had similar trends in permitting before the Fee announcement (Table 4 ). The estimates using the five months before announce- 8.2. Royalty Rates, Bonus Payments, and Well Productivity. Next, we estimate the effects of the Fee on royalty rates, bonus payments, and well productivity. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 in Table (6) show some evidence of a negative shock to royalty rates in Pennsylvania in the five months before announcement. Estimates in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 show a weak rebound in royalty rates in the announcement period, indicating that the pre-announcement decline in rates did not persist into the announcement period. Then in the enactment period, rates dropped by 0.59 to 1.20 percentage points depending on the sample. In all samples, lower royalty rates in Pennsylvania persisted in the five to ten months after enactment. To put the rate decrease in perspective, one percentage point represents about a six percent decline in the average royalty rate in leases signed in Pennsylvania in the pre-announcement period.
The bonus payment estimates in Table (7) generally follow the estimates for royalty rates.
Pennsylvania and control states had statistically similar prior trends in bonus payments.
Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 show that following enactment payments in Pennsylvania declined by about one log point, with the effect growing larger in the five to ten months after enactment in three of the four samples (missing bonus payment data for the liquids-rich sample did not permit estimation of this effect). A decline of one log point represents a 63 percent decline, so in percentage terms the effect of the Fee on the most common bonus payment is much larger than the effect on the royalty rate.
The estimated decline in royalty rates and bonus payments are perhaps best interpreted as lower-bound estimates since the Fee may have caused firms in Pennsylvania to become more selective in which parcels they lease, increasing the quality of the average leased parcel. And for royalty rates, any liquidity constraints introduced or exacerbated by the Fee payment and the decline in natural gas prices could have caused firms to favor compensating resource owners via royalties (paid in the future) relative to compensation through bonus payments (paid upon leasing), offsetting some of the decline in rates.
Estimates in Table ( 
Why Did Leasing Decline So Much? The Role of Liquidity
In the five months before the announcement of the Impact Fee proposal, firms leased an average of 11,500 acres in Pennsylvania every two weeks. We estimate that enactment caused this number to decline to 3,350 acres (a 71 percent decline). Applied to the ten months following the Fee enactment, the effect translates into 164,000 fewer acres being leased. The Fee represented about 5 percent of the cost of drilling a well and would have made some acreage uneconomical to lease and drill, but it is hard to imagine that leasing would be so sensitive to a modest increase in drilling costs.
Another explanation for the decrease is that the Fee's timing and implementation created a short-term liquidity burden on firms and reduced cash available for leasing. Firms could have arguably conserved more cash by cutting drilling since it costs more to drill a well than to lease the associated acreage. Some of the costs for wells drilled in the post-enactment period, however, were sunk in the pre-enactment period (leasing, surveying, permitting, site preparation). Perhaps more importantly, leases expire unless production activities (e.g. drilling) start before expiration of the lease's primary term. Avoiding the need to re-acquire previously leased land-and perhaps at much less favorable terms-would have motivated continued drilling.
9.1. Empirical Approach. We explore the role of liquidity on firm behavior by exploiting variation in firm-specific Fee payments. The Fee's enactment resulted in a larger payment for firms that had drilled more unconventional wells in Pennsylvania in 2011 or before. We estimate the relationship between each firm's initial Fee payment and the change in acres leased in Pennsylvania before and after enactment. Specifically, we estimate
where ∆y it is the change in the firm's total acres leased in Pennsylvania over two periods and F eeP ayment i,2011 is the firm's 2011 Fee payment, which was paid in September of 2012 and was based on unconventional wells drilled in Pennsylvania in 2011 and before.
The specification in (2) is a first-difference model, with a firm fixed effect removed through differencing. Although represented in levels, the variable F eeP ayment i,2011 is equivalent to the change in Fee payments over the study period because no payments occurred before 2011.
We estimate four versions of equation (2), with the difference being the definition of the pre and post period. In the first three versions, the pre period covers the five months before announcement. In the first version the post period covers the five months after announcement; in the second version the post period covers the five months after enactment;
in the third version the post period covers the five to ten months after enactment, which is when the first Fee was paid. In the fourth version the pre period covers the ten months before announcement, and the post period covers the ten months after enactment. All models are estimated with all firms leasing land in Pennsylvania according to the Drillinginfo data and that also permitted a well in the state during the study period. The focus on firms permitting wells eliminates entities that acquire acreage using cash from larger firms and that never operate wells and therefore would not be subject to the Fee. For Fee payments, we match firms from the leasing and permitting data with payment data from the Pennsylvania Utility Commission.
9.2. Results. Fee payments had no association with changes in leasing immediately before and after the Fee announcement. A negative relationship emerges when looking at months zero to five after enactment and more so when looking at months five to ten (column 3
of Table 3 ). Looking at the ten months before announcement and the ten months after enactment gives a slightly smaller but more precisely estimated coefficient. The largest effect of payments on leasing is observed when using months five to ten as the post period, which is when the payment was actually made. We note that natural gas prices consistently increased over the five to ten month period, indicating that the results are not caused by a concurrent decline in natural gas prices that affected high-payment firms more than low-payment firms.
The estimates indicate that each $1,000 in 2011 payments led to a one-half acre decrease in area leased in months five to ten after enactment relative to the five months before 14 We use a weighted EUR, with the weights based on the share of the natural gas endowment in each contour.
For prices, we assume a natural gas wellhead price of $2, $3, or $4 per mcf, which roughly match the minimum, mean, and maximum prices observed for delivery of gas to Dominion
Transmission's pipeline in northeast and southwest Pennsylvania according to data from Platts for the 2010-2014 period.
We calculate pass-through via bonus payments by taking the 63 percent decline in the most common per acre bonus payment in Pennsylvania ($612) and multiplying it by the area covered by the typical well. Industry sources suggest a standard well-length of around 3,000 feet and a width of 750 feet.
15 Table ( 10) provides the parameters and calculations of pass-through via lower royalty rates and bonus payments under different scenarios. In the most likely scenario, resource owners pay about half of the Fee ($116,423/$245,000). Total pass-through increases to 63 percent at a higher natural gas price ($4/mcf), which reflects a greater value of production and therefore a greater value of a one percentage point decline the the royalty rate.
Despite a larger proportional decline in the bonus payment than the royalty rate, the lower royalty rate accounts for 83 percent of pass-through in the most likely scenario. This is because most compensation occurs through royalties, not bonus payments: one Marcellus well can generate over $1 million in royalties while the associated bonus payments may only be $30,000 (50 acres x $600).
The Fee is only passed through to resource owners who leased their land after the introduction of the Fee. Previously signed leases generally remain in effect as long as production occurs. The zero pass-through of the Fee on existing leases and the incomplete pass-through on new leases supports the qualitative findings of the effects on leasing. The less that firms can pass the Fee onto resource owners, the greater the acreage that becomes uneconomical for firms to lease in the presence of the Fee. With the Fee, we therefore estimate that each well generates $322,860 in revenue for the state (=$228,777+$94,000). Without the Fee, it would take 3.4 wells to generate the same revenue (=322,860/94,000). The Fee would increase revenues to the state if it reduced drilling by less than 71 percent (from 3.4 wells to 1 well), which is likely given our estimated effects for wells drilled.
Conclusion
Opposition to taxing or regulating industries with negative externalities often stems from beliefs that such policies reduce investment and overall economic activity. Our empirical assessment of Pennsylvania's Impact Fee on shale gas wells indicates that such tradeoffs exist: the leasing of land for drilling declined substantially in Pennsylvania relative to control states following the introduction of the Fee.
Yet, the existence of the tradeoff does not undermine the motivation for policies like the Impact Fee. A decline in leasing or drilling may indicate that some acreage was leased and drilled even though the full cost of development exceeded the full benefits. The Impact Fee changed the economics for these marginal areas, discouraging their leasing for drilling. In addition to discouraging excessive drilling, the Fee generated revenues to mitigate externalities imposed upon residents. Mitigation may be especially important to protect the welfare of local residents without mineral rights or jobs in the industry but who nonetheless face greater traffic and deteriorated roads. The cost of the Fee, in turn, is borne by industry and resource owners through less leasing and lower royalty rates. To the extent that it would affect total production and regional natural gas prices, it would also be borne by consumers.
At the same time, the retroactive implementation of the Impact Fee, especially in a time of low natural gas prices and shrinking credit availability, likely exacerbated the effect on leasing. We estimate that Fee-induced liquidity constraints accounted for at least 60 percent of the decline in leasing, indicating that much of the forgone acreage leased is still attractive for development even with the Fee. Had the state amortized payments for previously drilled wells, the Fee may have had a smaller effect on industry investment while still raising revenue to pay for damaged roads and other public costs of shale development. Notes: A firm's group is determined by the location of its leased acreage from month -10 to month -5. The Fee announcement occurred in month -5 and enactment in month 0. 
